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CITIZEN ACCESS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN A
TRANSNATIONAL AND FEDERAL CONTEXT
By Eric Stein * and G. Joseph Vining **
THE INDivmuAL CrrizE

IN INTERNATiONAL LAW

In an international legal order dominated by states, the individual citizen is generally viewed as lacking international legal personality. It is
true with little exception that an individual cannot appear in an international forum, political or judicial, to press his rights. Despite the dramatically increased emphasis upon international protection of basic human
rights, individuals have been given access to international dispute-settlement machinery in only a few isolated instances within the United Nations
system, and on a regional level pursuant to the European Convention on
Human Rights.'
The Paris Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) and the Rome Treaties establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC,
the Common Market) are the only international agreements providing for
a judicial tribunal of general compulsory jurisdiction open not only to
member states and Community institutions but individual citizens as well.
The purpose of this essay is to explore the case law of the Court of Justice of the Communities and the considerations that may have motivated
that Court in its effort to define limits on access by individuals seeking
judicial review of acts of Community institutions and to inquire whether
Of the Board of Editors.
•* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.

The substance of this article was presented at the workshop organized by the Institute
of Advanced Legal Studies in London, July 1-4, 1975.
1 International civil servants may press their service-connected grievances before administrative tribunals established by the United Nations and the specialized agencies.
M. B. AKExuRsr, TaE LAW GOvrmNrNG EMPLOYMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
(1967); ByuNG CHUL KOH, THE UNiTED NATIONS AD.NmSqTATIVE TRIBUNAL (1966).

If the state concerned consents, an individual may complain against it to a committee
of experts under the UN sponsored Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 15 INrL & Comp. L.Q. 996 (1966). Pursuant to
procedures evolved in UN General Assembly Committees and in certain other UN
bodies, individuals may file petitions and even may be heard in person. Individuals

may complain directly to the European Commission of Human Rights if the state against
which the complaint was lodged recognizes such jurisdiction, but only the states contracting parties and the Commission have access to the European Court of Human
Rights.

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms, Arts. 25 and 48, 213 UNTS 221 (1955).
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experience with judicial review of administrative action in a federation
may be relevant to the evolution of transnational European administrative
law.
Tmum CASES
A convenient way of introducing the subject is to present three little
dramas in contemporary costume, drawn from three different milieux:
(1) The Federal Comptroller of Currency, an agency supervising federal banks in the United States, issued a regulation allowing federal banks
to expand their activities into the business of selling data processing services. A trade association of companies also engaged in selling data processing services and claiming loss of profit and customers sued the Comptroller to obtain review and annulment of the regulation. The data processing companies relied on a federal statute which prohibited banks from
engaging in any activity other than the performance of bank services.
In 1970 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld their standing
to sue.'
(2) In the nineteen sixties, the Parliament of the German Federal Republic appropriated funds to the individual German States (Ldinder) for
the purpose of subsidizing construction of wine vaults by German wine
producers and thus increasing their competitive position in the Common
Market by improving the quality of their wine. The Land in question
allocated the subsidies to wine producers but refused the application of
a company engaged in wine marketing. The company sued for review and
annulment of the Land decisions granting the subsidies to producers, alleging illegal denial of an equal opportunity to compete. Its business consisted of entering into long-term contracts with wine producers for the
annual purchase of quantities of wine at a minimum price, storing the wine,
and ultimately marketing it. As a result of the subsidies, the producers
were now able to market wine directly to consumers at a cheaper price
than competing retailers who like the plaintiff company did not have access to the subsidy. The Federal Administrative Court upheld the plaintiff
company's standing to institute judicial review.3
(3) In 1968, the Commission of the European Communities decided to
grant substantial subsidies from Community funds to three Italian sugar
refineries to enlarge their production. The award was conditioned upon
enlargement by the Italian Government of the production quotas allotted
to the three refineries within the Italian quota fixed by the Community.
The plaintiffs, competing sugar refinery enterprises who did not get any
subsidies, sued in the Court of Justice of the Communities for review and
annulment of the Commission's decisions, alleging unlawful distortion of
competition in violation of the articles of the Treaty on subsidies, because
their own production quotas were to be reduced to make possible the required enlargement of the quotas of the three subsidized competitors. The
2

Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970).
3 Judgment of Aug. 30, 1968, 30 BVerNvGE 191.
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Court denied standing to sue on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to
4
demonstrate a direct and individual concern.
Thus in the United States private plaintiffs claiming consequential harm
have been given standing to contest a general regulation. In Germany
they have been permitted to contest decisions addressed to third parties.
But in analogous situations in the European Economic Community (EEC)
they have been denied standing to sue. Two of the three milieux are
more or less mature federations in which citizens are directly subject to
federal and state laws. The third is different-a hybrid, "a new legal order in international law." - It is a treaty-based international organization,
but is distinctive among such organizations in its broad impact upon the
rights and obligations of individual citizens.
To what extent does or should this distinction make a difference? Should
or will the experience of the Community follow that of mature political
federations? Or should we approach each sui generis and see nothing remarkable in current differences in treatment of apparently similar problems?
Ti

FEDEATION AND T=E Co~niuNrrY:

Soimm DissncrrmAnms
The comparative method, in law or in any other discipline, has its problems. Above all there is a danger of losing sight of controlling dissimilarities behind the smokescreen of superficial likeness. It may help to
avoid pitfalls if we review some of the relevant similarities and differences
between the European Economic Community and a federal system as exemplified by the United States.
At the core of our inquiry is the position of the individual before governmental authority in an increasingly complex and technology-based
society, which now exists on both sides of the Atlantic. On one hand government regulation steadily widens, and on the other individuals and groups
demand ever greater recognition and participation in governmental processes. In the United States as in the Community, governmental authority
is divided among separate hierarchies of institutions exercising normative
powers. The United States has states with different constitutions, a federal government, fifty state judiciaries, and a federal judiciary. But in
the United States, the power of the federation dwarfs the states' power.
In the Community the balance goes the other way. In the United States
there is little question about the basic legitimacy of the governmental institutions, even though today the Watergate cloud is still hovering over
them, while in the Communities the institutions are brittle and as yet have
little grass roots participation. Moreover, Community lawmaking is in
Cases 10 and 18/68,, SocietA "Eridania" Zuecherifici Nazionali et al. v. Commission

of the European Communities, 15 RECUFIL
DES COMMUNAuTis EunRoP

rNEs (REc.)

DE LA JUIUSPRUDENCE DE LA COUR DE JUSTICE

459 (1969).

5 The Court of Justice of the Communities in Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transporten Expeditie Andernemung van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Tariefcommissie, 9 REc.
1 (1963); [1963] EuRoPFAm CourT REPORTS (ECR) 1 at 12; [1963] COlMON MARE
LAW REPORTS (C.M.L.R.)
105; Co.NamicE CL.EMAIN HousE, Chicago, Co1N(oN
MARKET REPORTR (CCH CoMm. ME-T. REP.) 18008.
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the hands of an executive. There is no popularly based legislature. In
the American federation, federal agencies and federal courts execute federal legislation (with some important exceptions such as federal grant programs where implementation is left in considerable part to the states).
But in the Community, member states carry the bulk of the responsibility
for implementing Community law: state officials issue import licenses and
collect customs duties; state parliaments transform major directives into
national law; and state courts decide controversies involving Community
law, albeit after preliminary ruling on Community law questions by the
Court of Justice.6 This broad decentralization and delicate symbiotic relationship between national and Community institutions at the political
as well as the judicial levels, to which there is no real analogy in the
United States, is a feature of crucial importance in evaluating the case law
on standing before the Court of Justice. The Community is a body at
the borderline between the federal and the international and in international law the very notion of an individual having independent standing
to sue before an international tribunal is little short of revolutionary.

THE STANDING QUESTION: WHAT THE COURT
OF JUSTICE SAM
With these differences in mind, let us turn to the similarities between
the American federation and the Community bearing directly upon the
standing question. In each the formal source of law determining the requirements of standing can be found in principle in a single normative
provision: in Article 173 of the EEC Treaty 7 and in section 10 of the
federal Administrative Procedure Act." In addition, however, federal
statutes often provide specifically for judicial review of specified types of
administrative action. Similarly, in the Community certain regulations,
such as Regulation 17 implementing the Treaty rules of competition, might
have the effect of broadening individual access to judicial review.0
Article 173 sets no limitations whatsoever upon the standing of member
states to contest any normative act of the Commission or the Council, nor
for that matter upon the standing of the Commission to contest acts of
the Council and vice versa. The much discussed second paragraph of
that Article provides that
[any natural or legal person may . . . institute proceedings against
a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another
person, is of direct and individual concern to the former.
6Art. 177 of the EEC Treaty.
7 The corresponding articles in the other Community treaties are Article 33 of the
ECSC Treaty and Article 146 of the Euratom Treaty.
85 U.S.C. §702 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). This discussion is limited to judicial review of acts of federal administrative agencies which have both rulemaking and decisionmaking authority. We do not address the special problem of judicial review of
congressional acts for constitutionality.

) Daig in H. voN DEa GROEBEN, H. vo BoEcKH, J. THmESING, 2 KOmMENTA-I ZuM
EWG-VERmTAG 209 at 234 (2nd ed. 1974); Peters in 3 C.M.L. lEv. 233 at 241 (1965).
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The posture of the Court of Justice with regard to this provision was set
in two groups of early cases in which the question of individual standing
was raised for the first time: Cases 16-17/62 and 19-22/62 in which associations of producers and associations of traders respectively sued for
annulment of Council regulations, 1° and the Plaumann Case 25/62,11 in
which a German importer of citrus fruit sought to contest a Commission
decision addressed to the German Government refusing to authorize a
reduction of the common external tariff on certain fruit imports from third
states. The Court denied standing in both instances and adopted a strict
reading of the requirement of "direct and individual concern." It did so
despite an express recognition of the principle in the Plaumann case that
provisions for access to legal remedy should never be narrowly construed.12
Judging by what the Court said, the factor that influenced it most was
the difference between the language in the second paragraph of Article 173
and the corresponding provision in the earlier Treaty Establishing the

Coal and Steel Community.13 That latter provision, which expressly grants
standing to contest acts of general application on the ground of d~tournement de pouvoir (misuse of powers, abuse of discretion) affecting a
VI Cases 16/62 and 17/62, Conf6d6ration Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et
Lgumes et al. v. Council, 8 &Ec. 901 (1962); [1962] ECR 471; [19631 C.M.L.R.
160; CCH Conf. MKT. REP. ,8005 at 7186. Cases 19/62-22/62, F6d6ration Nationale de la Boucherie en Gros, etc. v. Council, 8 REc. 943 (1962); [1962] ECR
491; [1963] C.M.L.R. 160; CCH Co_%ai. Mx'r. REP. 118006.
ICase 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission, 9 REc. 197 (1963); [1963] ECR
95; [1964] C.M.L.R. 29; CCH Cosrfs. MKT. REP. 118013 at 7274.
12 In the above cases the attorneys for the defendant Council and Commission urged
an even more restrictive interpretation that would have denied any association capacity to sue as such under any circumstances despite the specific Treaty language to
the contrary ("any . . . legal person") and that would not recognize a government
as a "person" within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 173. The Court
rejected these assertions and on this issue followed the conclusions of its Advocates
General.
= Article 33 of the ECSC Treaty reads: "...
Undertakings or the associations referred to in Article 48 may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings against
decisions or recommendations concerning them which are individual in character or
against general decisions or recommendations which they consider to involve a misuse
of powers (detournement de pouvoir) affecting them (ti leur 6gard-ihnen gegeniiber)."
Compare the above language "decisions . . . concerning them" with the requirement
of "direct and individual concern" in the corresponding EEC Art. 173(2) supra.
There is considerable literature comparing the ECSC and the EEC Treaties on this
issue and commenting on the case law. See e.g. G. BEBR, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF TE
EtmOPEAN Commu.N rrns 68-77 (1962); A. TizzANo, LA CoMTE Di GrusT=zn DELLE
CoImUNrr.X E RoPEE 396-415 (1967) and also in R. QuAr u, R. MoNAco, A. TRsABuccas, 3 TRATrTO IsTrIVo DELLA COss-%aUNrTr. EcoNoiacA EURoPEA, CosrasENTARIO 1277-85 (1965); Daig in KomN.rNAR supra note 9, at 222-36; C. H. ULE,
EMPFIEHLT ES SICH, DIE BESTiLMUNGEN DES EUROPXISCHEN GzamiNscHAFTSREciTs iiBER
DEN RECHTSSCHUTZ Zu ANDERN" UND ZU ERGCNZEN?, GuoTACHTM
ft DEN 46. D=nTscimN JumsTENTAG 13-32 (1966); Bebr, Recours en annulation et en carrence in
W. J. GANSHOF VAN DER MEERSCH (ed.), LEs NovELLEs, Dnorr DES CONMUNAUT s
EUROP. EXNES 309-19 (1969) with bibliography at 309; Rasquin et Chevallier, L'article
173, alinja 2 du Traiti C.E.E., 2 REv. Tm . DR. m. 31 (1966); Barav, Direct and

Individual Concern: An Almost Insurmountable Barrier to the Admissibility of Individual Appeal to the EEC Court, 11 C.M.L. REv. 191 (1974).
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plaintiff, bad been given a rather liberal interpretation by the Court. The
Court concluded from the differences between the two treaties that the
authors of the EEC Treaty deliberately intended to restrict access of individuals to the Court, presumably because of the much broader power
to issue general regulations granted to the EEC institutions and the much
wider range of persons affected by the EEC Treaty. "It is not for the
Court to pass upon the merits of such system," the Court stated, "since the
latter clearly stems from the text under scrutiny."
The formula that the Court evolved in the early cases for the application of the second paragraph of Article 173 may be summarized as follows:
(1) An act is a "regulation"--as opposed to a "decision in the form of
a regulation" I-if, by its "legal nature," it applies to categories of persons
treated theoretically. Private persons may not contest such a general regulation under any circumstances. 15
(2) "Decisions" may be contested, but persons other than those to whom
a decision was addressed must show not only a direct concern but also an
individual concern. They can claim an individual concern only if the
decision affects them because of factors peculiar to them or by reason of
circumstances "in which they are differentiated from all other persons and
by virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the
case of the persons addressed." 6
Professor Waelbroeck has called the second part of this formula "not
enlightening," which is a resounding understatement. The real question,
he wrote, is to know just what the characteristics or fact situations are that
"individualize" a person.' 7 It is nevertheless this formula or its variant
that the Court has repeated in every case and applied to deny standing
to all the "natural or legal persons" who thus far have come before it as
14 According to Article 189, a "regulation" is "directly applicable" by national courts
and other authorities throughout the Community territory.
15 Cases 16/62 and 17/62, Conf6d6ration Nationale, supra note 10. The Court
added in Conf6d6ration Nationale that it would look beyond the official designation of
the act as a "regulation":
Consequently, in order to determine in doubtful cases whether one is concerned
with a decision or a regulation, it is necessary to ascertain whether the measure
in question is of individual concern to specific individuals. In these circumstances,
if a measure entitled by its author a regulation contains provisions which are capable of being not only of direct but also of individual concern to certain natural
or legal persons, it must be admitted, without prejudice to the question whether
that measure considered in its entirety can be correctly called a regulation, that
in any case those provisions do not have the character of a regulation and may
therefore be impugned by those persons under the terms of the second paragraph
of Article 173.
[1962] ECR at 478-79. In support of a more liberal interpretation, see A. Trzztwo,
supra note 13, at 404-11. But see Bebr, Recours en annulation et en carrence, supra
note 13, at 318. On the above cases, see note by Cartou in [1962] SmEy JuiuspuuDENCE 126.
16 Case 25/62, Plaumann, supra note 11, [1963] ECR at 107. Since the plaintiff
in this case was not concerned "individually," the Court found it unnecessary to deal
with the question of "direct" concern.
-7Waelbroeck, Les eompdtences de la Cour de Justice (II), [1971] REv. Cnrrqsu.
iDE JumspRuDENcE

BELGE

513 at 530.
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plaintiffs,"" with the exception of three cases.

E

Let us consider this triad

in some detail since it may be easier to divine the Court's criteria from
cases where standing was granted than from the much more numerous
cases where it was denied.
Tnm

TkAD

WmmE STANDING WAS ALLOwED

case,'9

In the Toepfer
the German Government import agency posted
a zero levy on the import of corn for a specific date as a result of a Com'8The cases in which this paragraph was applied or discussed are: Cases 16 &
17/62, Conf~d6ration Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et L6gumes et al. v. Council, 8 REc. 901 (1962); [1962] ECR 471; [1963] C.M.L.R. 160; CCH CoxsM. Mrr.
RES'. 18005. Cases 19-22/62, F6dration Nationale de la Boucherie en Gros et du
Commerce en Gros des Viandes et al. v. Council, 8 REc. 943 (1962); [1962] ECR
491; [1963] C.M.L.R. 160; CCH CoxNs. MKT. REP. 118006. Cases 31 & 33/62, Milchwerke Heinz 1V6hrmann & Sohn KG et Alfons Lfitticke GmbH v. Commission, 8
REc. 965 (1962); [1962] ECR 501; [1963] C.M.L.R. 152; CCH Cozai. MT.REP.
f18007. Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission, 9 REc. 197 (1963); [1963] ECR
95; [1964] C.M.L.R. 29; CCH Comm. Mrr. REP. ff8013. Case 1/64, Glucoseries
R6unies v. Commission, 10 REc. 811 (1964); [1964] ECR 413; [1964] C.M.L.R. 596;
CCH Co..
MKT. REP. 18024. Case 38/64, Getreide-Import Gesellschaft v. Commission, 11 Rc. 263 (1965); [1965] ECR 204; [1965] C.M.L.R. 276; CCH Comm.
MiEr. REP. 18033. Case 40/64, Marcello Sgarlata et al. v. Commission, 11 REc. 279;
(1965); [1965] ECR 215; [1966] C.M.L.R. 314; CCH Co.mM. MKT. REP. ff8034.
Cases 106 & 107/63, Alfred Toepfer et Getreide-Import Gesellschaft v. Commission,
11 REc. 525 (1965); [1965] ECR 405; [1966] C.M.L.R. 111; CCH Comm. MT. REP.
18031. Case 30/67, Industria Molitoria Imolese et al. v. Council, 14 REc. 171 (1968);
[1968] ECR 115; CCH CoMaf. MKT. REp. 18060. Case 6/68, Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt GmbH v. Council, 14 lEc. 595 (1968); [1968] ECR 409; [1969] C.M.L.R. 26;
CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. ,8063. Cases 10 & 18/68, SocietA 'TEridania" Zuccherifici
Nazionali et al. v. Commission, 15 REc. 459 (1969); CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. ff8099.
Cases 63 & 64/69, La Compagnie francaise commerciale et financi6re, SA v. Commission, 16 REc. 205 (1970); [1970] C.M.L.R. 369; CCH COMm. MKT. REP. 18090,
18091. Case 65/69, La Compagnie d'approvisionnement, de transport et de credit,
SA v. Commission, 16 Ec. 229 (1970); [1970] C.M.L.R. 369; CCH CoMM. MT.
REP. 18092. Case 69/69, SA Alean Aluminium Raeren et al. v. Commission, 16 REc.
385 (1970); [1970] C.M.L.R. 337; CCH Co,.%n. MT. REP. 18110. Case 15/70,
Amedeo Chevalley v. Commission, 16 REc. 975 (1970); CCH Co Na. MT. RE,.
18115. Cases 41-44/70, NV International Fruit Co. at al. v. Commission, 17 REc.
411 (1971); CCH CoLm. Mi-r. REP. 18142. Case 15/71, Firma C. Mackprang, Jr.
v.Commission, 17 REc. 797 (1971); [1972] C.M.L.R. 52; CCH Co,'r.
MT. REP.
18155. Case 62/70, Werner A. Bock v Commission, 17 REc. 897 (1972); [1972]
C.M.L.R. 160; CCH Co-Lm. MKT. REP. 18150. Case 42/71, Nordgetreide GmbH &
Co. KG v. Commission, 18 REc. 105 (1972); [1973] C.M.L.R. 368; CCH Comrm. MT.
REP. 8174. Cases 9 & 11/71, Compagnie d'approvisionnement, de transport et de
credit SA et Grands Moulins de Paris SA v. Commission, 18 REc. 391 (1972); [1973]
C.M.L.R. 529; CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 18177. Case 96/71, R. & V. Haegeman v.
Commission, 18 REc. 1005 (1972); [1973] C.M.L.R. 365; CCH Comm. MT. REP.
18181. Case 134/73, Holtz & Willemsen GmbH v. Council, [1974] ECR 1; [1975]
C.M.L.R. 91; CCH Comm. MKr. REP. 18255. Case 175/73, Union Syndicale at a!.
v. Council, [1974] ECR 917; [1975] C.M.L.R. 131. Case 18/74, Syndicat G6n~ral
du Personnel des Organismes Europ6ens v. Commission, [1974] ECR 933; [1975]
C.M.L.R. 144. Cases 44, 46 & 49/74, Marie-Louise Acton et al. v. Commission, [1975]
ECR 383. Case 72/74, Union Syndicale t al. v. Council, [1975] ECR 401.
10 Cases 106/63 and 107/63, Alfred Toepfer v. Commission, supra note 18.
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mission error. Seizing this opportunity, plaintiffs, large grain wholesale
enterprises, applied for import licences on the zero-levy basis. When the
error was discovered, German and Commission officials consulted and
agreed on a course of action. The German Government invoked its safeguard power under a Council regulation which enabled the German agency
to reject the requested licences. The Commission, pursuant to the same
regulation, issued a decision directed to the German Government and
"authorizing" its safeguard measure retroactively. It was this Commission
decision that the plaintiffs sought to have annulled. The Court held that
the plaintiffs had standing. They were concerned "directly" because the
Commission decision was "directly applicable" to them; 20 there was no
need for any further action by the German Government. The plaintiffs
were also concerned "individually" because the number and identity of
the parties affected by the Commission's act ("no less than 27 companies")
were determinable at the time the decision was adopted.
In the Bock case,2 ' as in the Toepfer case, the Commission responded
to a request from the German Government and addressed a decision to
that government authorizing it to reject already pending applications for
import licences, including one by the plaintiff. In this case also the Court
granted standing: The plaintiff was concerned directly (even though the
formal rejection of the licences required an act of the German Government and in theory, it was argued, that government might have decided not
to use the authorization to reject). The plaintiff was also concerned individually, because, as in Toepfer, his licence application was already pending at tlhe time of the Commission decision and "the number and identity
2
of importers thus affected was certain and determinable." 2
Finally, in the International Fruit case, 22 the Commission, as part of a
safeguard system designed to ensure stability of the apple market was
given authority to consider the total quantity of apples for which import
licences were requested and to decide what percentage, if any, of that
quantity should be admitted. In that context, the Commission issued a
"regulation" limiting the percentage and preventing acceptance of the applications for import licences filed during a specified past period with the
Dutch Government. Plaintiffs whose applications were among those re2

0The Court equated "direct concern" with the important Community concept of
"direct applicability" and this raises some interesting problems which are beyond the
scope of this article. The former is a procedural prerequisite for action before the
Community Court; the latter goes to the merit of an individual's claim against a member state enforceable in a national court. For comments see Fromont in [1966] REc.
DALLoz-SmEy, JUiuspRuDmcE 58; Peters in 3 C.M.L. REv. 233 (1965).
2l-Case 62/70, Werner A. Bock v. Commission, supra note 18. For a comment,
see Verougstraete, 8 CAlER DE Daorr rmR. 666 (1972).
22 The Commission "was in a position to know that the decisions would affect only
the interests and legal status of these importers. Under these circumstances the importers are set apart from all other persons in a manner similar to the addressee"
(CCH Comr. MKT. REP. at 7720).
23 Cases 41/70-44/70, N.V. International Fruit Company et al. v. Commission,
supra note 18. For a comment, see V.C. in 99 JOURNAL DE DROrT INTERNATIONAL 687,
693 (1972).
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jected were given standing to sue for annulment of the regulation which,
the Court said, was in effect a bundle of individual decisions.2 4 Plaintiffs
were concerned directly because after the Commission had acted the member governments had no intervening power, no discretion whether or not
to accept or reject that action. The plaintiffs were also concerned individually because the Commission based its regulation upon applications
already filed. Hence the number of the parties concerned was determined
at the time of the adoption of the regulation even though the Commission,
acting upon the aggregate quantity of apples for which import licences
were requested as reported by the Dutch Government, had no knowledge
of the identity or even of the number of the parties affected.
THE

COURT OF JUSTICE IN SEARCH OF A RATIONALE

The manner in which the Court and the Advocates General have employed the prerequisite of "direct concern" manifests an intense interest
in maintaining the delicate balance between member state and community power, and we shall turn to this shortly. But the three cases where
standing was allowed, seen against the background of all the cases where
standing was denied, demonstrate the difficulties the Court and the Advocates General have encountered in drawing a line between what is and
what is not of direct concern. Is the presence or absence of administrative
discretion on the part of the member state under the challenged Community act the determining factor? And in which situations is such discretion present? In the Toepfer case where a Commission decision granted
the requested authorization to the German Government the Court found
a direct effect upon the plaintiff, although the Advocate General disagreed.
In theory the German Government still had discretion whether or not to
make use of the Commission's authorization but this did not seem to
bother the Court. 25 Yet in the Eridania case denying standing, one of
the three dramas at the beginning of this article, the most remote possibility that the Italian Government might not make use of an authorization,
which in fact it had recommended and to which it was financially committed, was enough for the Court to deny direct effect.26 In the Alcan
case 27 where the Commission in a decision addressed to a government
24 Subsequently, the Court dismissed the case on the merits.

L5 The Court said that the Commission decisions modifying or abolishing safeguard
measures are "directly applicable" because Article 22 of the regulation under which
the Commission acted provided that the Commission's decision shall take effect immediately and therefore "[iut would be illogical to say that a decision to retain proAlfred Toepfer v. Commission, supra
tective measures had a different effect....
note 18, [1965] ECR at 411.
c Cases 10 and 18/68, Eridania, supra note 18. See also Adv. Gen. Roemer in
Case 1/64, Glucoseries R6unies v. Commission, and in Case 26/62, Plaumann & Co.
v. Commission, and also in Cases 106/63 and 107/63, Alfred Toepfer v. Commission,
supra note 18.
27 Case 69/69, SA Alcan Aluminium Rearen et al. v. Commission, supra note 18.
See also Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission, supra note 18; cf. Adv. Gen.
Cand in Case 38/64, Getreide Import v. Commission, supra note 18.
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refused an authorization, the Court found no direct effect on the plaintiff
although the refusal eliminated any discretion on the part of the addressee
government. ( The Advocate General found a scintilla of discretion in the
possibility that the government might appeal the decision to the Courtl ) 28
The Court has struggled in a similar way with the second prerequisite,
that of "individual concern." In the Eridaniacase, with which we began,
the Court denied individual (as well as direct) effect, contrary to the
advice from the Advocate General, to Italian sugar producers who were
affected by a Commission decision granting subsidies to their competitors.
But there were only twenty-five sugar producers affected. In another case,
the Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt, not more than 30 raw sugar producers in the
entire Community were in fact directly affected by a Council regulation
and there was no real chance of new producers being added in view of
the depressed conditions in the sugar market and the size of the necessary
investment. 29 Such "de facto individualization" satisfied the Advocate
General but not the Court. Again, in Getreide-Import, despite the Toepfer
ruling, a German importer-plaintiff was held not to be "individually" concerned by the Commission's decision fixing a price on imports for a specific date, although he was ultimately the only one to request an import
licence on that date.3 0 It would seem that in the Court's view, the plaintiffs can be considered "individually" affected only if they are members of
a group of persons whose identity and number are fixed and, in addition,
if the challenged act has a retroactive effect on their legal position, that
is, if the act affects their "vested rights." But it is not the unfairness or
the actual harm in retroactive lawmaking that moves the Court to grant
standing. In two more recent cases where a retroactive effect clearly
existed, the Court found no standing.3'
28

Advocate General Gand relied here on the views of his colleague Roemer in

Plaumann. In the Alcan case Advocate General Gand pressed the argument that if
the Commission's decision had granted the requested authorization to the government the decision would not have direct effect on the plaintiff; consequently, the
actual decision in this case refusing the authorization must be equally -without direct
effect on him, apparently in the interest of symmetry. Case 69/69, Alcan, supra note
18, CCH Comlm. MKT. REP. at 7256. Daig distinguishes the decisions in which the
Commission addresses an order, prohibition, or authorization to a member state. Daig
in Kol&ENrAn, supra note 9, at 232-33.
29 Case 6/68, Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt v. Council, supra note 18.
See also Case
1/64, Glucoseries RMunies v. Commission, supra note 18, where both the Advocate
General and the Court found no individual effect.
so Case 38/64, Getreide-Import Gesellschaft v. Commission, supra note 18. For
comments on this case, see Mailinder, Privater Rechtsschutz im Recht der Europdischen Wirtschaft-sgemenschat, [1965] BEIrMB 1312; ULEz,
supra note 13 at 17-19.
The Court attempted to distinguish the case from Toepfer on the ground that, unlike
the Toepfer situation, the Commission did not know of the plaintiff's application at
the time of its decision. Bebr feels this factual difference might explain the hvo different holdings "at least partially." Bebr, Recours en annulation et en carrence, supra
note 13, at 315. See also Case 30/67, Industria Molitoria Imol6se v. Council, supra
note 18.
31 In Case 69/69, Alcan v. Commission, supra note 18, the Court found no direct
concern and remained silent on the issue of individual concern although Advocate Gen-
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We might note that in the Glucoseries case, the Court, after reciting the
Plaumannformula, proceeded to inquire into the "general economic scope"
and "purpose" of the Commission's act.3 2 The preoccupation with the
"purpose" of the challenged act may suggest one reason why the Court
may have granted standing in Toepfer and Bock, two of the three Community cases Where standing was allowed. In Toepfer some evidence
suggested a collusion between national and Commission officials to erase
an administrative error through means not entirely compatible with good
administration, 33 and in Bock an improper delay and perhaps arbitrary recourse to a protective measure. It is significant that in both cases the
Court ultimately annulled the contested act in proceedings on the merits.
In the InternationalFruit case, the third case of the triad, the Court may
have been concerned, in granting standing, that the Commission should
not be in the position of precluding judicial review of its act by labelling
it "regulation" rather than "decision" 34 This somewhat speculative line
of analysis would suggest that in reality the Court may be inclined to look
beyond jurisdictional arguments and grant standing where it senses an
element of irregular administration.'
This possibility aside, it is fair to say in summary that with respect to
"direct concern," the Court of Justice has sought to give content to the
requirement by invoking a Community interest in preserving the discretion of member governments; but the distinctions the Court has made on
this basis are so illogical that one may question whether there is yet a
workable or meaningful doctrine of "directness." As for the "individual
concern' prerequisite, the Court seems to require that a plaintiff show
something in the nature of an exclusive legal right analogous to a "vested
right," something similar in its impact, as we shall see, to the original
common law standing test in American federal law.
eral Gand held individual concern to be present. In Case 64/69, La Compagnie
franfaise v. Commission, supra note 18, the Court found no individual concern even
though, according to the plaintiff, the contested provision of the Commission regulation applied to a group of specified enterprises (including the plaintiff) since these
enterprises were positively known and identifiable even before the contested provision
was issued. The Court stated: "The fact that a transitional rule concerns only certain situations created prior to a date which it sets and which are therefore often determined even before the rule goes into effect does not prevent such a rule from
being an integral part" of and sharing the general character of a regulation. Thus
retroactivity alone is not enough "unless there is a misuse of discretionary power."
CCH Co

MKT.REP. at 8323.

3-Case 1/64, Glucoseries R6unies v. Commission, supra note 18.
3
Kovar in 93 JotmNAL DE Dnorr INrTATIONAL 707, at 711-12 (1966).
34 In his opinions in the International Fruit case, Advocate General Roemer stated:
"[I]t is extremely doubtful that we are actually dealing with a regulation in the sense
of the definitions that were so often given in previous decisions of the Court" (CCH
But see Case 64/69 La Compagnie frangaise, supra
Comm. MT-r. REP. at 7635).
note 18. In that case, denying that a provision in a regulation was of individual concern to the plaintiff, the Court said: "Unless there is a misuse of discretionary power,
such a provision shares in the general legal nature" of the regulation (CCH Comm.
MN-r. REP. at 8323).
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ELEMENTS OF LEGAL PoLICY

One may well wonder what considerations have induced the Court to
reject even the modicum of flexibility suggested by its own Advocate General,3 5 particularly if we recall, by way of a contrast, the Court's imaginative and teleological approaches to other institutional questions.30
(1) We have already mentioned the political concern with respect to
member governments. A real likelihood of the exercise of member state
discretion in implementation does appear to be relevant to the technical
definition of a "direct" concern in the Community act being challenged.
But Advocate General Gand went so far as to invoke "diplomatic courtesy" dictating that state discretion and state "sovereignty" not be impaired,3 7 language reminiscent of the International Court of Justice which
umpires international disputes among states.
While prudence is obviously in order for a freshly established judicial
tribunal in a body politic where states play a crucial part, the method
by which the Court has sought to limit its jurisdiction is, as we have suggested, open to question. Moreover, can the Court seriously assert respect
for states' rights and sovereignty when a plaintiff, claiming present harm,
is offering to show that the contested Community act is illegal and thus
can not serve as a legal basis for further state action?
(2) Another and perhaps more compelling consideration was articulated by Advocate General Lagrange: Since the Treaty is largely a "traite,
cadre" or framework law which normally must be implemented by general
regulations, the possibility of even a partial annulment of such a regulation poses "an extreme danger" to the system, if, as is frequently the case,
the regulation represents a laborious compromise reached in the Council
pursuant to the unanimity rule or practice. 3 The solution, he suggests,
lies in increasing the role of the European Parliamentary Assembly in the
legislative process so that there is less danger of paralysis if the compromise is annulled. In the present circumstances, it may also be recognized
that it is difficult to brand a Council regulation unanimously adopted by
representatives of the member states as "illegal" even where it appears to
be inconsistent with the Treaty: it would be to a degree a modification
of the basic law albeit in disregard of the amending procedure. These
considerations, however, would hardly apply to standing with respect to
Council regulations of lesser stature, routine regulations of the Commission, or to Commission decisions addressed to other persons (particularly
to private parties).
3
5 E.g. Advocate General Roemer in Case 6/68, Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt v. Commission, supra note 18. It is, however, difficult to reconcile Mr. Roemer's own position
in this and in the Glucoseries case 1/64, supra note 18, unless one concludes that the
lapse of four years and the intervening experience with the system led him to change

his mind.
3

6 See Stein, Review of Europiiisches Gemeinschaftsrecht by Hans Peter Ipsen in
22 AM. J. COMP. L. 156 (1974).
37 Case 69/69, Alean, supra note 18, CCH CoMm. Mirr. REP. at 7256.
38 M. Lagrange very likely had in mind the type of Council regulation comparable
in substance if not in form to an act of Parliament which, according to the French
conception of separation of powers, could not be made subject to judicial review.
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The Court may also have had in mind another argument advanced by
Commission jurists with respect to Council regulations which the Commission is required to implement. Even where a plaintiff feels directly
injured by a general regulation which he considers illegal, he should be
denied standing, it is said, until the regulation is actually applied to him
by a Commission decision addressed to him, at which time he would have
standing to contest the decision. 39 Apart from making rational business
planning impossible, the argument does not take into account a potentially
serious or even irreparable harm that might result from the delay.
It has been suggested that the Court ought to develop more nuanced
criteria of standing depending upon whether the act is predominantly
"legislative" or purely "administrative," such as a Commission decision
addressed to a government 40 41and responding to its request for a special
exemption from a general rule.
(3) The political considerations are no doubt buttressed by the inherent
aversion of administrators everywhere (including the United States) to
judicial control. Attorneys appearing in defense of the Council and the
Commission have been uncompromising and consistent in their opposition to plaintiff standing. The Court of Justice is not a federal court, and
even the Supreme Court of the United States would hesitate to rule in a
controversial matter against both the Congress and the Executive. In
very few instances has the Court of Justice ventured substantially beyond
the Commission's position in important systemic questions. The opposition of the Commission and Council makes it difficult to do so on the
standing issue. While the Commission has invariably urged liberal, purpose-oriented interpretations in defining the scope of its own power or
the power of the Communities generally, it has taken the narrowest and
the most mechanistic position in the standing-to-sue cases where the question was one of potentially curbing its own power.4 2 However, at this stage
of development, the opposition of Community attorneys to a more liberal
interpretation may be due as much to the customary bureaucratic aversion
:-1 In that case, the Court could also consider the legality of the Council regulation;
if it found that the regulation infringed the Treaty, it would annul the decision, holding the underlying regulation inapplicable pursuant to Article 184.
-' It is, in any case, doubtful that the Court would want to adhere to its present
narrow interpretation of "individual concern" should a private party contest a decision addressed not to a member state but to another private party, as is likely to
occur particularly in the field of competition. E.g., a Commission decision addressed
to parties to a restrictive agreement which exempts the agreement from the Treaty
prohibition and third parties (competitors) feel aggrieved by the decision. P. J. G.
KAPTEYN and P. VEnLoRpE NVwNTmFNiAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EURoPEAN Com.nmuNrrEs AFTER THE AccEsSION OF NEW MEMBER STATES at 169 (1973).
41A. W. GREEN, POLMCAL INTEGRATION BY JuBIsPRuDENcE-THE WORK OF THE
COURT OF JUsTICE OF THE EURoPEAN Co.NLmvsNIEs iN EuRoPEAN

TMOl 111 (1969).

PouncAL INTEGRA-

4CSome of the Commission's extreme positions were criticized by the Advocates General. We were able to find only one case in which the Commission's counsel, having
first taken a rather untenable position against standing on one of the two requirements, reversed himself in the course of the proceeding. Case 38/64, Getreide Import
Ges. v. Commission, supra note 18, Opinion, [1965] ECR at 211.
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to any deviation from an established policy line as to a strong attachment
to principle.
(4) The Court has said that it cannot modify the Treaty. In one case
the plaintiff contended that, if recourse to Article 173 were denied to him
because of a narrow interpretation of the text, he would be deprived of
all judicial safeguards both under Community lav and under national law,
which would be contrary to the basic principles governing all member
countries.4 3 The Court responded that these considerations could not "be
allowed to override the clearly restrictive wording of Article 173, which,
it is the Court's task to apply." 4 Yet at least in the case of an individual
contesting a decision addressed to a third party, the question involvedthe interpretation of the words "direct and individual concern"-is hardly
a matter of Treaty modification.Of course in many, though not in all cases, the plaintiff would in fact
have recourse to national courts, and, via the procedure of Article 177, to
the Court of Justice, which then would have an opportunity to pass upon
the validity of a decision or regulation in a "preliminary ruling," with a
binding effect upon national courts. This procedure involves substantial
cost and delay. 46 Nevertheless, from the very outset the Court has interpreted access to national courts for the purpose of enforcing individual
43
Kovar criticizes such potential "denial of justice," supra note 33, at 710.
44 The Advocate General buttressed this view by adding that:
[t]his argument can only avail if the applicants first prove that the Treaty gives
Frivate individuals concerned a guarantee of direct and complete legal protection,
for it clearly cannot fall within the powers of the Court of Justice to amend the
Treaty on this point.
Case 40/64, Sgarlata et al. v. Commission, supra note 18, Opinion, [1965] ECR at 235.
45 In defining the reach of Article 173(2) the Court must have had in mind the
long-range consequences in national legal systems if it ignored the principle underlying
national constitutions that, in a system of power relationships based on law, an affected
citizen must presumptively have some remedy against illegal official action. The German Federal Constitutional Court has ruled that at this stage of integration it retains
power to review a Community act for compatibility with the Federal Constitution if
it is claimed that the act violates a basic right protected by the Constitution. Decision of May 29, 1974, 37 BVerfGE 271 (1974).
48 Since, according to Article 177, only the court of last instance is required to
refer the Community law questions to the Court of Justice, it may take years before
(supra note 13, at 19-20, 22)
the case reaches the highest national court. Uri
considers this route "a diflicult and prolonged detour." He suggests (de lege ferenda)
a modification of Article 173(2) that would omit the requirement of direct and individual concern and allow standing to contest a decision addressed to another if the
plaintiff's "legally protected interests" are affected. Thus the Treaty would conform
to German administrative law which allows standing in case of impairment of a right
as well as a legally protected interest. Ule cites J. H. Kaiser, Mailtinder, and possibly
Badura as supporting this suggestion. He cites Zweigert, Lagrange, Mathijsen, Catalano, and Ehe as urging replacement of the requirement of "direct and individual"
or (Daig) of "individual" so as to broaden access to the Court. Zweigert, Empfiehlt

es sich, Bestimmungen iiber den Rechtssehutz zu lndem?

HAuPT-EFERAT, ZmiN
JAHmE RECcirSPRECHUNG DES GEmacsTrsHOFS DER Euiop'XscHEN CFmEiNscHAzEN 580-

97 (1965). Rapport fait au nom, de la Commission juridique sur la protection juridique
des personnes privges dans les Communaut&s europ~ennes, Rap. M. A. Deringer,
PARL. Euii. Doe. 39, 3 May 1967.
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rights derived from Community law in a most liberal way, far beyond
what may have been the intent of the authors of the Treaty. The Court
has clearly preferred to enhance its jurisdiction, and the protection of individuals, through this avenue which is particularly appropriate to the
symbiotic Community system, rather than by opening up the individual's
direct access pursuant to Article 173. In this, the Court has succeeded
beyond any expectation, considering the many cases referred to it by national courts from the member states. Because of the political problems
which a member state or a Community institution faces in initiating an
action against an institution or a state before the Court, the Article 177
procedure has become the most frequently employed course for enforcing Community law. More recently, the Court has also given a more liberal interpretation to the Treaty provisions allowing private persons to sue
the Community for damages caused by an act of a Community institution.4 7 The question for the future wvill be whether these procedures are
sufficient.
(5) It is interesting to speculate whether the Court has been influenced
in this field by the laws of the member states.
The Court's records show that the Advocates General, if not the Court
itself, have at least had in mind the relevant national laws and practices.
But there has been no unanimity of opinion. M. Lagrange, the distinguished first Advocate General from the French Conseil d'Etat, was prepared to discount the fact that "the legal situation within the Community
is undoubtedly less favorable [to the plaintiff] than that which has been
reached for a greater or lesser length of time by some of the Member
States, but it is similar to that known in other States." 48 His counterpart,
the able Mr. Roemer, coming from private corporate law practice in Germany, appeared troubled, in 1968 at any rate, by the Court's formalistic
approach as compared with rules applied by the German Federal Administrative Court, and particularly by the possible constitutional implications of leaving a citizen without any remedy. 41 The current German
and Italian Advocates General appear to take somewhat different views
on the relevance of national administrative law solutions to analogous Community cases.70
47 Cf. Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Commission, supra note 18, with Case 4/69,
Alfons Liitticke GmbH v. Commission, 17 REc. 325 (1971), CCH CoAM. Mn'r. REP.
T8136. See also Case 5/71, Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Schippenstedt v. Council, 17 lEc.
975 (1971), CCH Co-mm. Mr. REP. 18153; Gilsdorf, Die Haftung der Gemeinschaft
aus normativem Handein auf dem Hintergrund der Rechtssprechung des Europaischen
Gerichtshofs, 10 EuRoPAREcHT 73 (1975).
4,Cases 19/62-22/62, F6d6ration Nationale v. Council, supra note 18, [1962] ECR
at 486.
45 Case 6/68, Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt v. Council, supra note 18, [1968] ECR at
418; Cases 10 & 18/68, Societa 'Eridania" v. Commission, supra note 18, CCH
Co~im. MKr. REP. at 8431-34.
;0Case 175/73, Union Syndicale et al. v. Council, supra note 18, [1974] ECR at
930 (Opinion by Mr. Reischl); Case 18/74, Syndicat G6n6ral du Personnel des Organismes Europ&ns v. Commission, supra note 18, [1974] ECR at 948 (Opinion by
Mr. Trabuechi).
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In any event, although the Court has not hesitated in other contexts to
canvass national laws for "general principles" that may be common to
them, we cannot find any evidence that the Court may be getting ready
to soften its strict posture in this area to reflect some of the more liberal
trends in national laws. The Court's present position is reminiscent of the
earlier German standing requirement that plaintiff show infringement of
"subjective public right" rather than the more flexible formula evolved by
German doctrine holding "legally protected interest" sufficient. Obviously
the liberal French jurisprudence has also had little impact.,"
(6) One factor which may explain the apparent absence of effective
pragmatic pressures on the Court to grant broader access is the still relatively limited scope of the Community regulatory power, confined essentially to customs union, movement of factors of production, and competition. Some of the economic and noneconomic forces and interests such as
environmental and consumer protection, which have had such impact on
the liberalization of the American rule, operate thus far, if at all, at the
national level and are only beginning to be reached by Community power.
(7) Finally, although the Court has been reticent on the subject, an important concern may be the possibility of multiplicity of suits should citizen access to the Court be defined in broad terms. We shall return to
this problem after a discussion of the American experience.
SmxING IN U.S. FEDERAL CouRTs: THE COMMON
LAW TEST AND ITS DEMISE

The Community Court's difficulties in applying its current interpretation
of Article 173 are similar to those experienced by American federal courts
in the decades before 1970. American doctrine has not been troubled by
a basic distinction between "decisions" and "regulations." Both have long
been judicially reviewable "administrative action." 52 But, as we have
seen, in specific circumstances "regulations" can be viewed in Community
law as a "bundle of individual decisions," - and it is likely that the classification of Community action as a "regulation" or not for purposes of the
first part of the second paragraph of Article 173 will follow and simply
express the resolution of the real problems of standing, which have to do
with the "individuality" and "directness" of the plaintiff's stake in the case.
Here the parallels between American and Community developments are
striking.
A concern that the judiciary not undermine the sense of responsibility
within administrative agencies for the legality of their programs, or interfere with the process of interest group accommodation carried on by agencies in the development of a program, has led to doctrines in American
51 The German courts and the doctrine have mitigated the rigor of the language of
the statute requiring that plaintiff be injured "in his rights." §42(2) Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung of Jan. 21, 1960. See also infra, text at note 60.
52
See, e.g., CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942); Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §551(13), 7 U.S.C. §§702, 704, 706 (Supp. V, 1965-1969).
53 Supra text at note 24.
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federal administrative law designed to allow postponement of judicial review where discretionary agency steps are still to be taken before enforcement of an agency decision or regulation. These, the doctrines of "finality"
and "ripeness," are now treated separately from the law of standing.
Whether that part of the Community standing test that focuses on member
state discretion is meant to take into account similar concerns is difficult
to know, in view of the way the "directness" prerequisite has been administered. It is quite clear, however, that access to judicial-review under
the American doctrines of "finality" and "ripeness" does not turn simply
on whether or not there is discretion. A showing of discretionary implementation is only the beginning of an analysis of the relative costs and
benefits of delaying judicial review. The argument that a plaintiff has
too indirect and attenuated a concern with administrative action if it does
not fix rights or obligations, an argument still made by government attorneys, has been labeled by the Supreme Court as having "the hollow
ring of another era." r4
With regard to "individuality," the basic rule of standing in the United
States until the late nineteen sixties was the common law test, under which
the plaintiff could invoke the jurisdiction of a court only if he could point
to a private legal right that would be violated by a named government
official if that official failed to show that his action was authorized-a
test which still obtains in many of the states today and which resembles
the formula now employed in the Court of Justice. It was only in 1970
that the U.S. Supreme Court expressly "discredited" this test and turned
to the Administrative Procedure Act for a definition of standing. 55 However, the formula drawn from the Act to replace the so-called "private
legal right" test did not burst upon us full blown. There is a history which
merits a brief account, for it indicates that we may be dealing with underlying currents of thought and concept that are likely to have an impact
on societies functioning in a comparable frame of reference.
The attack upon and demise of the 'legal right" test had two main historical roots. One involved "economic" interests and the other "noneconomic." On the economic side, it has been a rule of the common law
that no person has a "right" to be free of competition. When a person
came into court and complained that he had suffered injury through the
increased competition of someone else made possible by an allegedly illegal government act or subsidy, the classic response was that he had no
standing to seek an injunction against the illegal act hurting him because
he had not shown the invasion of a legal right of his "own." For instance,
in 1938 competing private utilities were held to have no standing to challenge the legality under the National Industrial Recovery Act of a program
of public work grants to municipalities for construction of electric distribution systems. In reading this case one immediately thinks of Eridania.
4 Marine Terminal v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970);
. ce Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness in Administrative
Law, 69 MicH. L. REV. 1443 (1971).
U-Supra note 8.
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The U.S. Supreme Court held that a person injured by government action
can not challenge that action in court unless the injury resulted in the
violation of a legal right,5 1 which the Court later defined as "one of property, one arising out of contract one protected against tortious invasion,
or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege." 57
There was never a self-evident logic to a position that because a business had no right to be free of competition it had no right to be free of
illegally created competition, and as government was seen to intervene
more and more into the market and affect and determine the relative advantages of the players in the market, business interests became more and
more determined to gain access to the courts to review the legality of administrative actions affecting them in this most important way. One response by the courts was to view the specific standing provisions often
written into statutes creating the regulating agencies and often couched
in vague terms-conferring standing for instance on "aggrieved" personsas congressionally mandated exceptions to the courts' own self-imposed
and restrictive requirement of a legal right. 8 Much more threatening to
the conceptual integrity of the legal right test, however, was the conclusion that if a person or group of persons could show that they were in
some sense the intended beneficiary of the establishment of an administrative regulatory scheme or any part of it, they could be viewed as having
"quasi-property" rights in the common law sense, and standing followed
when government officials administered the scheme in such a way as to
deny the benefit. This was a transparent circumvention of the legal right
test, for such persons as the private utilities operating around the territory
of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and claiming to be the beneficiaries
of that authority's limited geographical jurisdiction, bad no private legal
rights under the common law of property and none granted them by the
statute. Nor was their standing arguably mandated specifically by Congress. Their quasi-property rights were recognized solely for the purpose
of standing to challenge the administrative action." This search for and
discovery of "beneficiaries" of the regulatory scheme was extended into
a number of fields beyond those of economic competition. The concept
recalls the 'legally protected interest" test in German administrative law
which, as we have mentioned earlier, German doctrine constructed as a
more flexible alternative to the rigid standing requirement that the plaintiff must show a "subjective public right." 60
56 Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938).
57
Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).
58 See, e.g., Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as

moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
59 See, e.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities, 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
60 See supra text at note 51. See also U.E supra note 13, at 21-22. Fromont believes, referring to the Toepfer case, that the Court of Justice in fact adopted the
"subjective public right" test without saying so in so many words. Fromont, L'influence du droit franfais et du droit allemand sur les conditions de recevabilit du
recours en annulation devant la Cour de justice des Communauts europdennes, 2
Rxv. Tamv. DR. =ur. 47, at 63 (1966). See also Fromont, Der Rechtsschutz gegen
Massnahmen der Verwaltung im Europa der Sechs, 4 EunopAmcHT 202 (1969).
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The second major thrust against the common law test concerned noneconomic values. It is usually impossible to claim any private or exclusive
right to the beauty, health, safety, or recreational opportunities so widely
regulated by modern administrative bodies. The money loss resulting
from a bureaucratically dictated change in relative economic advantage
was at least discrete and theoretically measurable, like other private harms
which the common law traditionally considered and sometimes prevented.
A noneconomic loss often did not resemble a loss of "property" in any
way. Yet it might be of even greater importance to an individual; and
as the growth of legislation and regulation established causal connections
between noneconomic losses and official action, lower federal courts began to give remedies to individuals against such action when it was illegal.
Consumers of television were granted standing to challenge the licensing
of particular television stations 61 and consumers of food were granted
standing to challenge the legality of adding color to oleomargarine.62 Frequently the courts claimed to be interpreting the general language contained in specific statutory standing provisions in various licensing acts,
provisions which most observers would have originally thought were included for the benefit of persons and groups, such as manufacturers of
food or chemicals or television licensees, economically associated with the
regulatory scheme in question and subject to administrative sanctions.
These cases in the lower courts go back to the 1940's and 50's, but appeared in great numbers during the 1960's and were ultimately cited with
approval in the 1970 decisions of the Supreme Court which brought about
the major change.
Tim NEw TEST
Technically, the change was effected by holding that the Administrative
Procedure Act, which had been enacted more than a quarter of a century
earlier, was a source of standing independent of both the common law
and the special standing provisions incorporated into the various acts setting up administrative agencies. The Act applies to all agencies unless
they are specifically excepted, and provides that any person is entitled to
judicial review of agency action if he "suffers legal wrong or is adversely
affected or aggrieved within the meaning of a relevant statute." Even
though the term 'legal wrong" was used in the statutory language, the
Court declared that the legal right test of the common law, under which,
it will be remembered, the plaintiff stated a cause of action only if he
showed a private legal right invaded by a government official acting under
the color of law, was discredited. The Court used the word "discredited"
and was unanimous in this regard. The Court then went on to construct
a new formula for the standing of private parties in challenges to administrative action, namely that the party must be "injured in fact" and
must show that "the interest he is seeking to protect"--to quote the language which the Court has since repeated in subsequent cases-is "argu0'Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
62 Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953).
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ably within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statute in
question," the "statute in question" being the statute setting up the administrative agency and providing substantive standards for judging the
legality of its actions. A French lawyer reading the language of this
formula might immediately think of his own "Interdt ( agir," the rather
63
liberal standing test developed by the Conseil d'Etat.
Applying the new test, the U.S. Supreme Court granted standing to a
trade association of independent data processing companies, and later to
a travel agency, to challenge the legality of regulations issued by the Comptroller of the Currency which permitted federal banks to compete with
them by expanding into the fields of data processing and travel services. 4
The Court made clear that it was not relying on any evidence that Congress had intended to make data processors or travel agents specific beneficiaries of bank regulation.s Two years later, the Court seemed to imply
that it would hear the challenge of the Sierra Club, a conservationist
group, to actions by federal officials of dubious legality which bad permitted Disney Enterprises to begin the development of a wilderness area
in a national forest in California, providing that the club showed that it
spoke on behalf of members who were injured, whether in economic or
noneconomic fashion, in their use of the wilderness area."6 Then, in 1973,
the Court did grant standing to a group of law students who used a national park and who challenged a railroad rate regulation that might have
the effect of polluting the park.67 In none of these cases could a claim
to a personal legal right be made out, nor were there specific provisions in
the statutes governing the agencies in question for judicial review of the
agency decision at the request of the plaintiffs.
One cannot doubt that the conceptual and pragmatic pressures that led
to these results would have succeeded in finding some other mode of expression if the language of the Administrative Procedure Act had not been
at hand ready for use.68 Had the judiciary truly conceived itself as lim63

Commissaire du gouvernement Mosset stated in his well-known conclusions that
standing to institute judicial review of administrative action will be given if the contested decision "injures the plaintiff materially or morally" and if the consequences
of the decision affect plaintiff in his capacity as a member of a "defined or limited
category." C.E. 26 Oct. 1956, Association CGn6rale des administrateurs civils, R.D.P.,
1956, 1309, cited in Fromont, L'influence du droit... , supra note 60, at 56.
64 The principal case was Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), described supra at note 2. See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147, 1151 (1st Cir.
1969), vacated 397 U.S. 315 (1970), reaffirmed 428 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1970), re-

versed 400 U.S. 45 (1970).

66 Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, supra note 64.

66 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
6
rUnited States v. S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
68 The Court commented at the time and has emphasized since that rules of standing are developed by the Court "for its own governance." Data Processing Service
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, supra note 2, 397 U.S. at 154; Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct.
2197, 2205, 2215 (1975). The Court had never required a statutory basis for its legal
right test. In essence the Court shifted the judicial presumptions within which legislatures must work. Legislative materials are now searched for a specific intent to deny
standing rather than a specific intent to grant it.
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ited to the protection of private rights except in those instances where the
legislature expressly instructed it to go beyond that role, a quite reasonable interpretation of the standing language of the Act was available.
As we have noted, many of the special standing statutes providing for
judicial review of certain agency actions in specified circumstances use
the term of art "aggrieved" to designate those persons who may seek redress, and it was open to the Court to conclude that the language of the
Administrative Procedure Act which suggested a ground of standing other
than "legal wrong," or invasion of private and personal legal right, was
meant to do no more than refer to those situations where specific statutory
standing was given to individuals by such statutes. But the Court did
not do so, and held instead that standing emanated from the Administrative Procedure Act itself. Although grounded in legislative languageas the formula for standing in the Court of Justice is grounded in Article
173-the decision to hear challenges to the legality of administrative action
in a larger number of situations was clearly a matter of judicial choice.
It is, however, far easier to see what American courts have put behind
them than to see what lies ahead. Lower federal courts have found the
new standing formula difficult to administer without opening their doors
to all litigants who have demonstrated a personal concern for the values
affected by the challenged action sufflciently strong to support the costs
of litigation.0 Explicit approval of such a result would not be incompatible wvith existing jurisprudence,70 and, as we shall note below,
might cause relatively few practical difficulties. But there are indications
that the Supreme Court is not prepared to go so far. In constitutional
judicial review of congressional action, litigants have sought to use developments in the review of administrative decisions to establish the standing of persons in their capacity as "citizens" to enforce the Constitution.
In its most recent decisions, the Court has explicitly rejected the concept
of the "public action" 71 and while, as we have noted, review of acts of
Congress involves considerations different from those governing the review of administrative action and has proceeded on doctrinely separate
routes, the Court used language in justifying its limitation on constitutional
standing that may apply to both the administrative and the constitutional
areas.7 2- Ironically, the difficulties in charting the reach of the new AmeriC6 See, e.g., Coalition for the Environment v. Volpe, 504 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1974);
Diggs v.Schultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. den. 411 U.S. 931 (1973);
Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
- See, e.g., Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian
or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968); SAx, DEFENDING TME ENvmoNxmET (1970).
-1 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, supra note 68; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166 (1974).
7 In addition, in one case following the announcement of the new formula three
members of the Court turned again to a special standing statute using the term "aggrieved" to justify hearing the challenge of a white resident of a housing project to
the legality of the housing agency's alleged exclusion of black applicants. The Justices did, however, concur in the majority decision to grant standing, which was based
on general principles rather than any specific permission by the legislature. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
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can administrative law standing formula and in determining whether a
constitutional challenge is more than a "public action" are now discussed
in terms of whether the plaintiff's injury or interest is sufficiently "individual" and "direct," 73 the very terms mandated by Article 173 for equivalent discussions in the Community. But all we can say with assurance
is that the questions of "directness" and "individuality" are not to be answered in the United States according to whether or not a private and
established right is at stake in the case.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: How RELEVANT IS

FEDERAL EXPERIENCE?

What has happened in the United States is a reflection of and indeed
now a principal symbol of a significant change in the conception of the
role of a judiciary in a modern administrative state. Courts are no longer
to be viewed as restricted to the settlement of private disputes and protecting vested private rights against government intrusion. The very
notion of a self-sustaining sphere of private rights into which government
action "intrudes" is now difficult to grasp. And with the growth of government it has been increasingly widely perceived that leaving government
activities outside that sphere to take care of themselves may well mean
leaving individual government officials essentially unchecked. Neither
bureaucratic processes nor the legislature itself is in fact capable of policing the activities of government agencies on a day to day basis. Not even
the U.S. Congress with its massive staff of experts can attend to details or
tend to them in time. The burden of inertia is such that relegating a
challenger to a legislative remedy is itself a decision on the merits.
In sum, we think the American courts and Bar have at last acknowledged
that they and their processes play an integral part in the business of government. Of course, in a pluralistic democratic society it is the elected
legislature that in principle has power and responsibility to determine the
hierarchy of common values and resolve conflicts among them. But no
society pursuing a multitude of public values of different weight and importance through a multitude of largely independent implementing agencies can do without courts and still hope to achieve a satisfactory realization
of its goals. The Supreme Court now speaks of "private attorneys general," a phrase which appeared as early as 1943 in the American judicial
vocabulary7 4 Responding to their initiative, American courts are holding
in check and inquiring into the legality of challenged agency action on
behalf of interests of a broader and more general concern than the private
interests in contract and property traditionally protected.
The Rome Treaty has made the Court of Justice an important part of
its mechanism for achieving its goals. In a body without an elected legis73

See, e.g., Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton,

supra note 66.
74Associated Industries v. Ickes, supra note 58. See also F.C.C. v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, supra note 2.
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lature, where law is made by national and transnational executives through
processes shielded from the glare of publicity, the judicial role is if anything even more essential than in a mature federation. As a single tribunal serving the entire expanse of the Community, the Court may understandably be concerned with judicial economy and avoidance of cranky
proceedings and multiplicity of suits. Both these dangers have troubled
American courts. The burden of merely being required to respond to an
argument on the merits and the potential for harassment resulting from a
broadened test of standing are no doubt among the factors making the exploration of the boundaries of the new American formula a rather cautious
one, particularly in the noneconomic area. But the State of Michigan and
several other American states are experimenting with environmental protection legislation that permits extremely broad access to courts, and the
experience to date is that no large scale multiplicity of suits is developing.
Rather the impact has been on the attitudes of the administrators and on
proceedings before them7 If in fact a great number of suits, perhaps of
an identical nature, are brought with a shift from a "private right" basis
for standing to the new formula, and given the cost of litigation that is
dubious, then the problem can be handled through consolidation and class
action procedures. 6 Whether a suit is cranky or not seems to us a matter
for the merits. If it is frivolous, it can be disposed of far more rapidly by
getting to the merits than by litigating the question of standing.
It has clearly been a wise judicial policy for the Court of Justice to encourage private plaintiffs to bring their complaints before their own national tribunal, despite the additional risks, cost, and delay which this may
entail. But as the scope of the Community regulatory powers broadens
to include other fields and affect other values, economic and noneconomichealth and safety, environment, consumer protection, energy conservationthe Court may well feel called upon to broaden direct access by private
complainants. If it does, we suggest that it will act not only to protect
private interests but also to advance the common interest in effective enforcement of Community legality and broader participation of citizens in
Community administration.
7Z,

Sax and Dimento, Environmental Citizen Suits: Three Years: Experience Under

the Michigan Environmental ProtectionAct, 4 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1 (1974).
-- See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 155 (1967). Although the
Court of Justice has made full use of the consolidation procedures, most recently it
has defined the standing to sue of associations so as to cause numerous separate actions to be filed by individual association members instead of a single action by the
association itself. Case 18174, Syndicat G6n6ral du Personnel des Organismes Europrennes v. Commission, supra note 18. See Cases 44, 46 & 49/74, Marie-Louise Acton
ct al v. Commission, and Case 72/74, Union Syndicale et al. v. Council, supra note 18.
The Court held, with the support of the Advocate General, that although an association has a general capacity to appear in court as a "legal person," and may also
participate as an intervenor, it cannot sue for annulment in its own name unless it can
show that it was aggrieved in its own functional rights (e.g., violation of its contract
with the public agency) or upon an express "mandate" from the aggrieved members.

